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Review Essay

OF GNARLED PEGS AND ROUND HOLES:
SUNSTEIN'S CIVIC REPUBLICANISM AND
THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION
The Partial Constitution. By Cass R. Sunstein.t Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press. 1993. Pp. vi, 414. Cloth,
$35.00; paper, $16.95.
Robert W. Bennett2
The Partial Constitution is Cass Sunstein's attempt to pull
together the elements of a civic republican vision for American
constitutionalism in the late twentieth century. Civic republicanism refers to a set of beliefs about government and its citizens,
traceable to ancient Rome, and associated especially with the
anti-federalist position in the debates surrounding ratification of
the United States Constitution. In its revolutionary American
form, this republicanism:
meant ... more than eliminating a king and instituting an elective system of government; it meant setting forth moral and
social goals as well. Republics required a particular sort of
independent, egalitarian, and virtuous people ... who scorned
luxury and superfluous private expenditure, who possessed
sufficient property to be free from patronage and dependency
on others, and who were willing to sacrifice many of their selfish interests for the res publica, the good of the whole
community.3

In Sunstein's contemporary rendition, two notions move to
center stage, The first is "the general commitment to delibera1. Karl N. Llewellyn Professor of Jurisprudence, The University of Chicago.
2. Dean and Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law. I received
helpful comments on a draft of this essay from my colleagues Gary Lawson, Tom Merrill,
Michael Perry, Daniel Polsby, and Stephen Presser. I am grateful to them, as I am to
Joseph Miller for able research assistance.
3. Gordon S. Wood, Republicanism in Leonard W. Levy, ed., Encyclopedia of the
American Constitution 448, 449 (Supp. I, Macmillan, 1992).
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tive democracy," which Sunstein says is at the heart of his approach to constitutional interpretation. The second is "status
quo neutrality." Sunstein explains that neutrality is essential for
the rule of law, and hence for constitutional law, but that it is
impermissible to adopt the status quo as the baseline for judging
neutrality, so that deviations from it are taken to be non-neutral,
and hence suspect or infirm. Instead in a deliberative democracy, baselines for judgment must be forged by reason, with no
favored position whatsoever for the status quo.
The book has a number of interesting and provocative discussions. It contains, for instance, a nice argument that law is a
pervasive influence in the formation of individual preferences, so
that we cannot simply assume that there is some prelegal set of
preferences that makes up the raw material with which the law is
to cope. (166-70) And it collects some interesting material as
part of its argument that people display a different preference set
when they are acting as decisionmakers in the public realm than
in the private. (179) Many of the most interesting parts of the
book are about baselines-for judging when the state has acted,
when speech has been regulated, when some activity has been
penalized and when it has been rewarded.
Unfortunately, the book lacks definition and coherence.
Sunstein uses key terms with little precision; in particular, he
never pins down what it takes to be a legitimating "reason." And
neither of the book's central organizing themes-status quo neutrality and deliberative democracy-seems in the end to tie much
together. Sunstein uses status quo neutrality to mean a lot of
different things, and his commitment to his stated disapproval of
a status quo standard of neutrality is belied by many of his specific discussions. His discussion of deliberative democracy leaves
many unanswered questions about how that deliberative democracy would serve its supposed ends. Both the concepts seem to
be mostly rhetorical devices deployed to unify a series of disparate positions on constitutional matters. Sunstein has earlier exhibited a passion for systematizing constitutional law beyond the
comfort level,4 and The Partial Constitution is in that pattern.
4. In one of his early articles pursuing what he characterized as "civil republicanism," for instance, Sunstein found a prohibition of something he called "naked preferences" to underlie much if not all of constitutional law. Cass R. Sunstein, Naked
Preferences and the Constitution, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 1689 (1984). I expressed doubt about
that early attempt at constitutional systematization in Robert W. Bennett, Reflections on
the Role of Motivation Under the Equal Protection Clause, 19 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1009 (1985).
The "naked preferences" idea appears in The Panial Constitution as well, but in a relatively subdued role. (25-27).
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In Parts I and II of this essay I describe and discuss Sunstein's notions of status quo neutrality and deliberative democracy. In Part III I sketch an alternative constitutional agenda for
the contemporary United States, one that might be called "neoMadisonian." Sunstein labors hard to enlist the Madison of the
Federalist papers in the cause of civic republicanism, but the attempt falls flat. In Part III I suggest that a commonly discussed
series of reforms that Sunstein entirely ignores, while surely
bringing their own costs, would be a good deal more in the spirit
of Madison's approach than are those to be found in The Partial
Constitution.
I

Sunstein defines "status quo neutrality" as "taking ... as the
baseline for decision . . . what various people and groups now
have: existing distributions of property, income, legal entitlements, wealth, so-called natural assets, and preferences." (3)
Under this conception of neutrality "[a] departure from the status quo signals partisanship; respect for the status quo signals
neutrality." (3) To Sunstein this is unacceptable. Rather the law
must be fashioned by bringing reason to bear on all questions of
entitlement. And the reason must be "public-regarding . . . .
Government cannot appeal to private interest alone." (17)
The role that Sunstein assigns to "reason" is seemingly unrelenting. "[G]overnment must always have a reason for what it
does." (17) Even "[t]he status quo ... may be accepted only on
the basis of the reasons that can be brought forward on its behalf." (135) These reasons must "independently" justify the status quo. (6) This means, of course, that government must have
reasons, and be prepared to advance them, not only for action it
takes, but for leaving things as they are.
Sunstein finds traces of this refusal to defer to the status quo
in the intellectual climate of our constitutional founding, but he
thinks it became embedded in our constitutional tradition in the
New Deal. "[T]he outstanding conceptual break" of the New
Deal, he tells us, was the appreciation "that ownership rights and
the status quo were products of government," (57) that common
law "ownership rights, and everything that accompanied them,
had been created by the legal system" (51) and could be undone
by it.
Sunstein is clear, however, that this New Deal project has
been realized only partially. He analyzes myriad contemporary
constitutional problems in terms of the failure to resist the allure
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of the status quo baseline. Thus, on the guarantee of free speech,
he says that we cannot simply accept the existing regime of property rights in media as non-regulation and hence constitutionally
unobjectionable. "In a regime of property rights, there is no such
thing as no regulation of speech .... " (206) Instead "protection
of property rights [in media] . . . must always be assessed
pragmatically in terms of its effects on speech." (206) In the
same vein, he lets his imagination run free in discussing a constitutional taking: "a state might be thought to 'take private property' if it ... uses law to disable the unpropertied from obtaining
things. "s (128)
In many of his most telling discussions, Sunstein uses the
concept of the status quo to refer, as in these examples, to entitlements associated with holdings of property at common law.
The definition quoted earlier, however, is a good deal broader
("existing distributions of ... preferences [among 'various people
and groups']"), and Sunstein does make use of the leeway provided by the broad definition. Thus he criticizes the majority
opinion in R.A. V. v. St. Pau/6 as grounded in status quo neutrality
for failure to appreciate that racial hate speech is distinctly stigmatizing, that it produces a hurt that is not simply like any other.
(251) And he argues for a reconceptualization of many issues
specially affecting women in our society by urging a willingness
to look beyond "the sexual and reproductive status quo" that is
"sometimes ... a locus of inequality." (260) This includes urging
that the First Amendment be conceptualized in a way that would
allow at least some regulation of pornography because of the
harm that it does to women. His discussion of this last point illustrates how easily he manipulates the concept of "status quo
neutrality."
Sunstein contrasts the prevailing approach to regulation of
pornography with that for obscenity:
Obscenity law, insofar as it is tied to community standards, is
. . . deemed neutral . . . . Antipornography legislation is
5. Sunstein does not advocate this position, but his dismissal of it comes in noticeably milder terms than his later rejection of a First Amendment theory turning the protection of the Amendment on whether the speech in question involves "rational thought."
He dismisses that theory because it would produce "major anomalies" and "jarring" results. (238) I make note of this not because I think Sunstein has any sympathy for a
constitutional right to steal, but because it provides an example, of which ~ will ~ote many
more, of how variable is the "reason" that seems to suffice for Sunstem. It 1s also an
example, of which there will also be more, of seeming implicit respect for the status quo.
For one thing that likely makes a result "anomalous" or "jarring" is that we are unaccustomed to it.
6. 505 u. s. - (1992).
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deemed impermissibly partisan because the prohibited class of
speech is defined by less widely accepted ideas about equality
between men and women-more precisely, by reference to a
belief that equality does not always exist even in the private
realm, that sexual violence by men against women is a greater
problem than sexual violence by women against men, and that
the sexual status quo is an ingredient in gender inequality.
(269)

Embedded here are factual assertions that three beliefs are
held at least more widely than the contrary beliefs: a) that equality between the sexes always exists in the private realm; b) that
sexual violence by women against men is at least as much a problem as sexual violence by men against women; and c) that the
sexual status quo is not an ingredient in gender inequality. Now
I doubt that many people believe any of these three things, especially a) and b).7 I should be amazed if more than a handful of
adults in the country believe b). More to the point, if these beliefs are taken to be part of some "status quo" that is illegitimately being used to define "neutrality," it seems a trivial use of
the status quo concept, far removed from common law property
entitlement. If all Sunstein means by "status quo neutrality" is a
position or belief held by some people (more "widely accepted")
with whom he is in the process of disagreeing, then it hardly carries the encompassing and portentous significance that he ascribes to it when he speaks of the "conceptual break" of the New
Deal.
If instead we confine the notion of "status quo neutrality" to
the concern with common law property, we find that Sunstein's
bark is more fearsome than his bite. As we have seen, he speculates that the prohibition of theft might be unconstitutional, but
he is really quite mild in the positions he actively advocates. Being untethered by common law property entitlement undoubtedly leaves him feeling more comfortable in advocating such
things as rights of access to mass media (221-23) and to privately
owned shopping centers (208) for those wanting to have their
say. But both those positions have previously been advocated by

7. I am not quite sure what c) is supposed to mean, or what it might be thought to
add to a). At other points in the same discussion, Sunstein refers to "the sexual and
reproductive status quo" (260) and to the "reproductive status quo." (267). If these various phrases are meant to be equivalent, then c) may refer to a belief that the physical, and
perhaps psychological, burdens on women caused by human reproduction should not be
seen as handicaps causing any worrisome "inequality." I have no idea how to judge
whether this idea is more or less widely held.
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courts and commentators who had not thrown common law
property notions overboard.s
Sunstein is actually quite eloquent in a defense of the institution of private property. Thus in discussing the takings clause, he
says:
To remove the clause from its moorings in existing distributions would ... repudiate a huge amount of long-standing law.
Judges should hesitate before doing that. [T]he notion that a
constitutional provision should protect existing holdings of
property from governmental disruption seems ... fully justified. That notion protects an important form of stability for
individuals and for the system at large. It also creates and
safeguards expectations that in turn help promote economic
planning, investment, and prosperity. Perhaps most fundamentally, it is a way of ensuring a degree of independence
from the whim of the state, which is a precondition for the
practice of citizenship. A system in which private property is
open to freewheeling public readjustment may well subject all
citizens to open-ended state power. This form of insecurity
introduces a kind of serfdom that is debilitating to democracy
itself. (128-29).

Given this defense, it is hard to know just what to make of
Sunstein's professed disdain for the "status quo" in property entitlement. To be sure, if reason is to govern, and is taken to be
independent of tradition, habit, precedent, and the like, and is
further assumed to give unique answers to the questions it addresses, it shouldn't matter if one takes private property or some
common pool as the starting point. In either event, the end point
dictated by reason would presumably be the same. The conditions, as we shall continue to see, are hardly self-evident. In any
event, Sunstein's defense of property seems to be a defense of
end points, and if that is so it is unclear what he means when he
insists that every time the government takes an action that affects
property, or fails to do so, it must have a justification based on
"reason."
In one sense, an answer may be transparent. The book is
full of proposals in which property interests are compromised to
8. On the shopping center issue see, e.g., Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551
(1972); Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 592 P.2d 341 (Cal. 1979), aff'd 447 U. S. 74
(1980); Michael J. Perry, Freedom of Expression: An Essay on Theory and Doctrine, 78
Nw. U. L. Rev. 1137, 1207-08 (1983); Gilbert T. Perlman, Comment, The Public Forum
from Marsh to Lloyd, 24 Am. U. L. Rev. 159 (1974) (passim). On the media access question, see Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367,375 (1969); Roscoe L. Barrow,
The Fairness Doctrine: A Double Standard for Electronic and Print Media, 26 Hastings
L.J. 659 (1975).
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some social goal. Many of those proposals are by now governmental commonplaces, like welfare programs, broadcasting access rights, limitations on sexual surrogacy arrangements, and
public access to some privately owned areas for the distribution
of information. Sunstein's disdain for common law property may
be part of a felt necessity to provide a capacious theoretical tent
where common law property and its frequent qualifications in
our society can dwell comfortably together.
If that is the motivating sentiment, however, there is no effective way to know what legitimately goes inside the tent and
what goes outside. Sunstein's talisman of "reason" certainly provides none. On free speech and property, for instance, Sunstein
says the following:
Some regulatory efforts, superimposed on current regulation
through current property rules, may promote free speech,
whereas the property rules may undermine it. Such efforts
might not be 'abridgements' of freedom of speech; they might
increase free speech. To know whether this is so, it is necessary to understand their purposes and consequences. Less frequently, the use of property rules to foreclose efforts to speak
might represent impermissible restrictions on speech. To
know whether this is so, it is necessary to assess the effects of
such rules in terms of their consequences for speech. In any
case both reform efforts and the status quo must be judged by
their consequences, not by question-begging characterizations
of 'threats from government.' (207-08)

The problem is that this discussion, with its emphasis on the
"consequences" for speech of some proposed regulation, is
pegged at an entirely different level of generality than is the earlier quoted defense of private property. Are the "consequences"
to be judged regulatory measure by regulatory measure? At one
point Sunstein suggests just that: "The legal question frequently
involves the weight, in the particular case, of the interests in stability and protection of expectations." (103) (emphasis added)
But then what is to assure that the totality of the infringements
on property from all the regulatory measures will not undermine
the "expectations that in turn help promote economic planning,
investment, and prosperity"? And what mechanism is there for
concluding that the accumulation of regulation will leave that
"degree of independence from the whim of the state, which is a
precondition for the practice of citizenship"? Conversely, if the
"consequences" for speech are to be judged on the basis of a
totality of regulation, the problems of judgments are unending
and insuperable, as each new proposal is subjected to "reason" to
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determine if it, in combination with everything already existing,
promotes enough speech to make it worth the cost in dispiriting
the sturdy citizen property holder. And if the answer is "no,"
presumably "reason" would have to be applied when each new
infringement on property is proposed to determine what of all
that exists then must go. The best one could hope for under
those circumstances would be constant instability of expectations
that the protection of property was meant to avoid.9
It is clear to me that the overwhelming assumption in contemporary American culture is that of private property, subject
to reasonable forms of public regulation, and that no conceptual
break of the New Deal made much of a dent in that assumption.
Sunstein's own analyses occasionally help solidify this impression, just as they belie his assertions to the contrary. For examples, let us look briefly at Sunstein's discussion of two largely
unrelated problems: the First Amendment status of regulation of
the broadcast media, especially to provide public "access" of various sorts (221-22), and the long-muddled problem in constitutional law of the distinction between "rights" and "privileges,"
and the attempt of government to condition the exercise of the
one or the other. (298-300)
Sunstein advocates extensive broadcast regulation, finding
no insuperable First Amendment obstacle. His rationale initially
seems grounded in his disdain for status quo neutrality. Recall
his comment that "there is no such thing as no regulation of
speech." (206) He examines various maladies of broadcasting
and advocates experimentation with a variety of regulatory
measures to address those ills. Throughout the discussion, however, he remains largely silent about regulation of the print media. He does say that "mild regulatory efforts should be upheld"
if the government seeks to "promote quality and diversity in the
newspapers," (225) but that stands in stark contrast to his vigorous advocacy of broadcast access. Indeed, he feels obliged to
bolster the case for "mild regulatory efforts" for newspapers by
noting "the fact that many newspapers operate as de facto monopolies." (225)
9. The only other justification that occurred to me for Sunstein's defense of private
property in the midst of a discourse that casts doubt on it at every turn was that the
defense might be solely for purposes of interpreting the Takings Clause. His discussion
does draw explicitly on both the words and the history of the clause. But that would not
make much sense either, since the defense he gives depends so centrally upon the psychology it generates in property holders. That psychology can hardly be generated with
separate compartments for separate constitutional provisions.
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The contrast here in Sunstein's approach reflects longstanding differences in the regulatory climates for the print and broadcast media in the United States, with the latter taken to be
subject to a great deal of regulation, because they are merely "licensed" to use the public airwaves.lo If one were applying
unadorned "reason" to the problem of media regulation without
regard to the "status quo," the disparity of regulatory climates
would be an obvious target. Many commentators have found the
distinction unprincipled, whether they have advocated that the
broadcast regulatory regime be extended to print media, or that
the print private property regime be applied to broadcasters.u
Sunstein's failure to address the anomaly seems explicable only
on the basis of some respect he accords to the prevailing regulatory assumptions, to the status quo. The regulatory regime from
which, relatively speaking, he keeps his distance-the print media-is the one characterized by the private property regimen
that he especially insists must always be open to public revision
in the light of reason.
Sunstein's fidelity to existing assumptions as the basis of entitlement also comes through in his discussion of the distinction
between rights and privileges. It has long been assumed that
government could not encroach on "rights" by imposing conditions on their exercise that would be unconstitutional if imposed
as outright requirements. Suppose, for instance, that my common law property right in beachfront real estate gives me exclusive access to the beach extending out from the property. And
suppose also that the government is constitutionally foreclosed
from forbidding that I speak publicly in criticism of it. The government is then foreclosed from conditioning my access to the
beach on my refraining from the public criticism.
The problem arises when the condition is imposed not on
exercise of a "right" but on receipt of a "privilege." Thus if the
government starts a welfare program, it is usually assumed that I
have no "right" to the welfare, only a "privilege."t2 Now suppose the government seeks to condition my receipt of the welfare
10. Cable systems complicate the picture somewhat and may even now be creating
pressure for some larger accommodation, but the complications are not really relevant for
the present discussion.
11. See Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Freedom of the Press vs. Public Access 241-45
(Praeger, 1976); William W. Van Alstyne, The Mobius Strip of the First Amendment- Perspectives on Red Lion, 29 S.C.L. Rev. 539, 544 (1978); L.A. Powe, Jr., "Or of the [Broadcast} Press", 55 Tex. L. Rev. 39 (1976); see also Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Press-A
New First Amendment Right, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1641 (1967).
12. Sunstein might accord a "right" to welfare. He argues for a "freedom from desperate conditions" as an important element in a deliberative democracy. (138)
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on my silence. Over the years there has been a fair amount said
in cases and constitutional literature that would seem to allow
this condition, or any other, on my receipt of a mere
"privilege. "13
Sunstein objects to any doctrine that would allow such conditions on receipt of something called a "privilege." His reason is
that the distinction between "rights" and "privileges" dissolves
once status quo neutrality is abandoned:
In a crucial sense, all constitutional cases are unconstitutional
conditions cases.... There is no fundamental or metaphysical
difference between the unconstitutional conditions case (welfare benefits will be eliminated for those who criticize the government) and the ordinary constitutional case (people who
criticize the government must pay a fine). The sharp distinction between ordinary cases and unconstitutional conditions
cases depends on status quo neutrality. (293)

With this analytical framework, Sunstein applies his "reason" to
the solution of a variety of the problems that the right/privilege
puzzle suggests. In doing so he draws "on a complex range of
considerations." (304) Included among them seems to be the
distinction between "rights" and "privileges," the very distinction
that abandonment of status quo neutrality was supposed to have
allowed us to escape.
Thus in discussing Lyng v. International Union, 14 in which
the Supreme Court upheld a provision of the food stamp program that withheld benefits from strikers, Sunstein offers this
tentative justification for the decision:
A plausible argument for this outcome would start with the
proposition that even if the government cannot forbid strikes
through criminal punishment, it may limit scarce resources to
people who are genuinely in need. Perhaps the government
may legitimately conclude that strikers are not in need in the
same sense as other unemployed people. (305)

Perhaps a distinction could be drawn between the use of criminal
penalties and of mere material inducements, such as welfare benefits, but this passage avoids the interesting question of what
13. The classic exposition is that of Oliver Wendell Holmes in McAuliffe v. Mayor of
New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517,517-18 (Mass. 1892) ("The petitioner may have a constitutional
right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman .... The servant
... takes the employment on the terms which are offered him."). For a modem example
in the welfare arena, see Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309,324 (1971) (the plaintiff "has the
'right' to refuse the home visit, but a consequence in the form of cessation of aid ... flows
from that refusal.").
14. 485 u.s. 360 (1988).
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would happen if the government didn't deny welfare benefits to
strikers, but rather assessed a "civil fine." The one is no less
scarce than the other, nor less appropriate because strikers are
assumed "not in need in the same sense as other unemployed
people." They would appear to differ only to the hidebound
among us who think of denying welfare as withholding something that is a public resource and a civil fine as the confiscation
of a private resource.
This should not describe Sunstein. As we have just seen, he
instructs us that "[t]here is no fundamental or metaphysical difference between . . . [the case where] welfare benefits will be
eliminated for those who criticize the government ... and ...
[where] people who criticize the government must pay a fine
.... " Despite this, in the end he expresses some continuing affinity for "a core and unavoidable insight of current law" in its
treatment of funding, licensing, and employment cases as according greater leeway to the government to deny or withhold. (305)
It is hard to see what that core insight is other than some close
kin to the status quo as represented by common law property.ts
I thus conclude that in the final analysis Sunstein, like the
rest of us, is under the spell of common law notions of property,
and probably of other aspects of the status quo. In all likelihood,
Sunstein's characterization of welfare resources as "scarce" is a
recognition that they are the government's to dispense in a way
that the strikers' property is not. Toward the beginning of The
Partial Constitution Sunstein comments that a status quo measure
of neutrality is widely held "so much so that it operates reflexively rather than self-consciously." (4) This is the reason, he insists, that "it accounts for so many understandings about the
meaning of the Constitution." (4) In the end, I fear that the
15. In principle I do not have much difficulty in finding that the government cannot
condition welfare on relinquishment of (at least many) constitutional rights. When the
government establishes a welfare program, it has defined those benefits as important, and
it is this fact that forecloses the condition. For this reason the case is quite unlike a claim
of "right" to welfare benefits, where there is no existing program. The latter claim should
be rejected on the ground that individuals do not have a claim on public resources akin to
the claim they have on their own resources. To be sure, once a welfare program is established, there will be legitimate conditions on entitlement-need, dependency, age, and
the like. To make the judgment that some condition is unconstitutional, it will be necessary in part to judge whether that condition is "like" or "unlike" the legitimate conditions.
The exercise of judgment cannot be avoided, but at least that judgment can take as a
given the legislature's acceptance of the general obligation. Herein, I think, lies some of
the contemporary attraction of the Equal Protection Clause as a vehicle for substantive
review of legislation. It focuses attention on a decision the state has already made as the
starting point for judicial analysis. I discussed this point at greater length in Robert W.
Bennett, Objectivity in Constitutional Law, 132 U. Pa. L. Rev. 445, 489-91 (1984).
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book proves this point fully as much by example as it does by
argumentation.
None of this is to deny that there is a real problem of baselines in constitutional law, nor that ambivalence about the status
quo is an important element of that problem. Sunstein has generalized the point, but recognition of the baseline problem is
longstanding. Any number of scholars have urged, in particular,
that a state action requirement fatally suffers from a baseline
problem. They note that the state through its laws requires, forbids, or tolerates everything, and hence that "state action" is always present unless perchance there is some comfortable
measure of the necessary state involvement.16 Any such baseline
has proved elusive, leading many of those scholars to urge that a
state action requirement serves no independent purpose.
What I do mean to deny is that Sunstein has advanced the
inquiry by insisting on "reason" as somehow substituting for the
status quo baseline. It is necessary to specify what counts as a
permissible reason with a lot more clarity than Sunstein has provided before one will have placed any real restraint on what can
be done in its name, or, for that matter, to have excluded the
embrace of accustomed ways of approaching problems embedded in the status quo.
Almost twenty years ago, Hans Linde cautioned that "[i]t is
a realistic postulate that laws do not get enacted for no reason at
all .... "17 Linde elaborated as follows:
a policy often results from the accommodation of competing
and mutually inconsistent values, or because it simply intends
to favor one interest at the expense of another, or because it
represents only a judgment of the justice or equities in the immediate issue without intending to accomplish any further
aim.ls
16. See, e.g., Horowitz, The Misleading Search for "State Action" Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 30 So. Cal. L. Rev. 208 (1957); Alexander, The Public/Private Distinction and Constitutional Limits on Private Power, 10 Const. Comm. 361 (1993). I expected
to find Sunstein embracing this position. Since he asserts that the "status quo" is entitled
to no presumption in its favor, it would seem to follow that state tolerance of what is, is all
the "action" that is required. For that reason I was puzzled to find him insisting that a
state "actor" must be actively involved. In the end, there is little difference between the
implications of Sunstein's approach and that of the state action skeptics, since Sunstein
insists that the state actor can be a judge, or other enforcement official, so that he would
find the necessary state involvement whenever there is any attempt to enforce private
prerogatives through public processes.
17. Hans A. Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 Neb. L. Rev. 197, 212 (1976).
18. Id.
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For Sunstein the problematic category is where legislation favors
"one interest at the expense of another," but Sunstein's error is
in (sometimes) seeming to assume that this can never supply a
"reason." Quintessential New Deal programs like social security,
farm support, and child labor laws are described comfortably in
such terms. This is not to say that one must approve or disapprove all such favoritism, but only that the difference lies in the
realm of values, and not of "reason" in any other sense.
I would also deny that the status quo is unattractive as a
presumptive baseline. Reasons come in lots of shapes and sizes,
and it is not at all obvious why respect for the status quo should
not qualify as one. The status quo has lots to be said for it, much
of which Sunstein has said.
His defense of property captures part of it. I'll paraphrase:
To deny the status quo presumptive respect "would ... [risk repudiating] a huge amount [of what we take for granted, and
which provides] .... an important form of stability for individuals and for the system at large." Respect for the status quo "creates and safeguards expectations" that foster secure and tranquil
lives, as well as "planning" and "investment." And it ensures privately defined reference points, giving "a degree of independence from the whim of the state."t9
But there is more. Respect for the status quo also makes
possible reform that is constructive rather than destructive.
There is a Burkean strain in American political thought that
views the status quo as embodying the accumulated wisdom of
the ages.2o Sunstein notes and rejects this view (or, perhaps
more precisely, dismisses it as a half truth, and then ignores the
non-dismissed half) (130-31), but Burke's insight is real, and
there is no reason why it cannot be accepted in degrees. If existing practices were too repugnant, they would not have lasted,
at least in a society that holds open avenues for change. What
has survived thus comes with some assurance that its costs have
19. Sunstein also generalizes the point in an interesting discussion of what he calls
"endowment effects," (166-73) the creation of expectations by existing distributions and
entitlement. He acknowledges that "the psychological effects of existing endowments"
supports a "partial defense" of "status quo neutrality," (171) but that point then goes the
way of so many others in his insistence that unrelenting reason can accord no preference
to the status quo.
20. See Burke, Speech on Reform of Representation in the House of Commons, in
James Burke ed., The Speeches of the Right Honorable Edmund Burke 405, 408 (1865)
("Speeches"). Hayek made the point even more explicitly. See F.A. Hayek, The Errors
of Constructivism, in New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics and the History of
Ideas 3, 10 (U. of Chicago Press, 1978) ("Errors"). Incidentally, each insisted that he
nonetheless welcomed reforms. See Burke, Speech on Economical Reform, in Speeches,
at 170; Hayek, Errors at 18-19.
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been tolerable. That might well suffice to allow the status quo to
form the presumptive base from which a society can then reason
about what to change.
Consider, for instance, the rule that custody of a child resides with its natural parents, absent renunciation, abuse or some
severe inability to bear the responsibility.21 In all likelihood, this
rule responds to extraordinarily powerful human emotions.
These are evidenced by contemporary social movements and
laws that would often accede to parental prerogatives, even in
the face of substantial evidence of unfitness, or of strong indications that the well-being of the child would be better served by
different custody arrangements. If we undertook a lot of research, we might accumulate data that would justify the usual
rule by some utilitarian or other calculus of the interests of children and parents, and of social cohesion. But it seems quite unlikely that we now have anything approaching data to support
such a conclusion. Should that mean that we welcome the application of unadorned Sunsteinian "reason" to solve the question
of where custody of children should normally reside? I doubt
that Sunstein would think so. He would doubtless urge that "reason" shows change here to be a bad idea. But it will have missed
the mark unless that "reason" draws on the fact that these arrangements have been accepted in our society for a very long
time-that they come with the kind of approval that only longstanding survival can provide. That is respect for the status quo,
and it is a reason, at least in the loose sense that Sunstein uses
the term.
Such respect need not be absolute. If weighty considerations counsel change, respect for the status quo should not stand
in the way. But without that respect, our reasoning has no
anchor, no place to return, when, as will so often be the case,
reason does not muster resolve. Reasoning without that anchor
in an uncharted sea of reasons would, later or more likely sooner,
give reform a bad name.
II

In a deliberative democracy as Sunstein depicts it, "public
officials would be accountable to the people, but also in a posi21. See, e.g., Homer H. Clark, Jr., The Law of Domestic Relations in the United
States, § 19.6, at 821-22 (West, 2d. ed 1988); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972).
For a powerful argument that the presumption might appropriately be loosened a bit, see
Elizabeth Bartholet, Family Bonds: Adoption and the Politics of Parenting (Houghton
Mifflin, 1993).
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tion to avoid interest-group power and thus to deliberate broadly
about the public interest." (v) In this system, "political outcomes
... are to be produced by an extended process of deliberation
and discussion, in which new information and new perspectives
are brought to bear." (134) The process is to be characterized by
"widespread participation by the citizenry," (135) but it does not
consist of summing up voter preferences in some fashion, "precisely because preferences have [themselves] been created by
legal rules." (11)
The participants in this process must have "a large degree of
security and independence from the state." (136) It is on this
basis, as we have seen, that the institution of private property
receives much of its justification. But this does not require inviolable private property rights, and indeed a redistributive tax system may be required, because in addition to property rights, "the
assault on dependency implies ... social programs designed to
ensure that no one is dependent." (136) Thus there must be
"freedom from desperate conditions," and "rough equality of opportunity." (138-39)
The deliberation is to lead to agreement, but the process is
not horse trading. Sunstein is at pains to distinguish civic republicanism from interest-group pluralism, where politics is seen as a
succession of accommodations among interest groups. One of
Sunstein's objections to interest-group pluralism seems to be its
detachment from substantive values. "[R)epublicans[, on the
other hand,) ... believe that there are frequently correct answers
to political controversy." (137) Apparently this does not, or does
not necessarily, mean that the answers are substantively better
than others that might be given, because the "[a)nswers are understood to be correct through the only possible criterion, that is,
agreement among equal citizens." (137) (emphasis added)
There is an awkwardness in this talk of a procedural criterion for determining those "frequently correct answers to political controversy," an awkwardness that is reinforced by the
book's devotion to so many substantive prescriptions for constitutional law. Many of these prescriptions could, I suppose, be
seen as suggestive only, demonstrations of the kinds of reasoning
in which a republican political process might engage, without any
intention to suggest that the resolutions somehow ought to dominate contrary agreements that might be reached "among equal
citizens." But there is one particular respect in which Sunstein's
devotion to republican processes is tested, and found halfhearted.
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In a sense, the question of the role of democratic politics in
the United States is the mirror image of the question of the role
of courts. Sunstein devotes explicit attention to the role of
courts, understandably since such questions have dominated recent constitutional debates in both the political and scholarly
realms. Sunstein indicates repeatedly that "[t ]he role of courts in
... [the] process will be limited," (140, see also, e.g., 9, 11), because of a variety of "institutional limitations" under which they
labor. The most basic of these is that judicial activism is inconsistent with the democracy part of deliberative democracy.
In Sunstein's telling, however, this leads not only to limits
but to an important role for the courts.
[T]he case for an aggressive role for courts is especially strong
in [only] two classes of cases. The first involves rights that are
central to the democratic process and whose abridgement is
therefore unlikely to call up a political remedy.... [Thus] our
interpretive principles ought to be especially attuned to harmful effects on the system of free expression and on political
participation and representation.

***

The second category involves groups or interests that are unlikely to receive a fair hearing in the legislative process . . .
[because of] pervasive prejudice or hostility .... Courts should
give close scrutiny to governmental decisions that became possible only because certain groups face excessive barriers to exercising political influence. (142-43)

This "representation reinforcement" rationale for judicial
revieWZ2 is, by now, standard fare among constitutional theorists.
For Sunstein's purposes, the first category may be largely (if not
entirely) unexceptionable, but that is not true of the second,
where "groups or interests" that have fair and equal access to the
franchise (and to media of communications) nonetheless "are unlikely to receive a fair hearing in the legislative process." Sunstein gives no hint of why as a "civic republican" he should find
"an aggressive role for courts" congenial in such cases, and the
answer is far from obvious.
It is by now well understood that the best available evidence
on which to base such judgments will usually be the substance of
the decisions affecting those groups.23 This means, of course,
22. The best known contemporary exposition of the notion is found in John Hart
Ely, Democracy and Distrust (Harv. U. Press, 1980).
23. See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 Yale LJ. 1063, 1f172-77 (1980). I say "usually" because there may be
occasions when one could uncover evidence of discussions among legislators showing
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that the courts will judge the fairness of those decisions, obviously using a standard for review other than "agreement among
equal citizens," which was supposed to be the only acceptable
criterion for the correctness of a political decision. The rationale
for their doing so, I suppose, is that a political decision in such
circumstances could not have been informed by full and effective
participation of those treated unfairly. But that observation only
serves to locate us on a vicious circle, not to solve the problem of
how to get off it.
I would have thought that the "civic republican" answer to
the dilemma was fairly clear, and contrary to Sunstein's. First, it
is not obvious why unelected courts should be thought to be
some decent substitute for fairly constituted legislatures if "the
only possible criterion" of correctness truly is "agreement among
equal citizens." Imperfectly constituted legislatures seem a
closer substitute, particularly given the assumption, for which
Sunstein argues, that individuals even in our present imperfect
world are able to cast aside personal interests when they enter
the realm of public decisionmaking. (179-83) Even now representative bodies make decisions for nonmembers all the time, not
only for all the nonlegislator citizens, but for members of unrepresented groups-for noncitizens, for children, for prisoners, for
the disengaged, for all those groups that have not succeeded in
placing members in the representative assemblies. Neither Sunstein nor any other commentator of whom I am aware suggests
doing away with most of these elements of unrepresentativeness.
It is unclear why Sunstein might trust legislatures with decisions
for some or all of those groups but not for the others he seems to
have in mind.
Second, and more important, substantive review in this second category of cases is on a collision course with Sunstein's general insistence on judicial restraint lest the processes of
deliberative democracy be diminished. For if the best way to
judge whether a group has been treated fairly in the political process is to review the substantive fairness of some action challenged by that group, then the two tend to become equivalent.
In the name of assuring a fair legislative hearing, the courts will
be called upon to review all manner of measures for substantive
fairness. The prospect should be chilling to a civic republican,
their conscious disdain for the interests of some group, or some other direct and useable
evidence of "pervasive prejudice" that does not take the form of unfair legislation or
other unfair government action. But such instances will be rare.
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and Sunstein provides no explanation of why he not only tolerates but encourages it.
One suspects that the answer lies in some results that he
seeks to justify. Whether this is so or not, Sunstein's discussion
of the constitutional status of abortion provides an instructive example of the problematic nature of trying to justify active judicial
review from civic republican premises.
Sunstein criticizes the opinion in Roe v. Wade for grounding
the interest of pregnant women in access to abortion in substantive due process. Instead he urges that the rubric of equal protection more comfortably accommodates abortion rights. He
adopts Judith Jarvis Thomson's argument that a prohibition of
abortion leaves pregnant women required to devote their bodies
to the sustenance of another in a way that others are not required
to do.24 (272-74) He suggests the hypothetical case of a father of
a child who requires a kidney transplant to save its life where the
father could be the donor without risk to himself. Sunstein suggests, almost surely correctly, that the father would not legally be
required to donate the organ. The example is thus telling evidence that the prohibition on abortion treats women unequally
and disadvantageously.
There are difficulties with the argument, and Sunstein discusses a good many of them. Of particular note is that men have
been drafted for service in the armed forces, and especially for
combat roles, while women have not traditionally been subject to
the draft. Sunstein notes that this might be thought to be a
"plausible counterexample." (276) In the end, however, he concludes not only that the example is not suggestive of equal treatment of men and women, but that it actually supports the claim
of unequal treatment:
legal requirements that only men be drafted are part of a system of sex role stereotyping characterized by a sharp, in part
legally produced split between the domestic and public
spheres-with women occupying the domestic and men occupying the public. In this light, legal restrictions on abortion
and a male-only draft serve similar functions. Restrictions on
abortion [remain] . . . an element in the legal creation of a
domestic sphere in which women occupy their traditional role
.... (276)

Satisfied that he has dealt with this and other arguments, Sunstein concludes that restrictions on abortion can only be under24. See Judith Jarvis Thomson, A Defense of Abortion, 1 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 47 (1971).
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stood as a product of a "discriminatory purpose ... ultimately at
work." (275)
Sunstein's argument here is a powerful one and it is skillfully
presented, but it is far from overwhelming. Perhaps the maleonly draft, and the use of men but not women for combat, is part
of a larger invidious treatment of women, but Sunstein has oversimplified the argument at several points. Fathers would not be
required to donate the organ, but neither would mothers. And
there is ample evidence that the burdens and benefits of service
in the armed forces have recently been borne and enjoyed by
members of racial minorities,25 groups that Sunstein and most
others have viewed as politically disadvantaged. Perhaps there is
some way to understand the motivation behind the now-defunct
draft as somehow invidiously to exclude women from a privileged public sphere, while the motive behind the present form of
the armed services is to project traditionally disadvantaged
groups into that same public sphere, but I have trouble wrapping
my mind around such a combination. The male-only draft may
be a perfectly good example of an institution that could not survive the application of "reason" to its evaluation, but in context it
supplies only the most ambiguous of evidence of a "purpose [to
disadvantage women] ... ultimately at work."26
Abortion remains an issue on which our society is deeply
divided, and on which political compromise is stymied. This is so
for reasons that surely have much to do with the role of women
in our society in all its complexity, but that also draw on myriad
religious, moral and political considerations. For an old-fash25. See generally, Martin Binkin, et al., Blacks and the Military (Brookings, 1982).
By 1992, blacks made up six percent of the generals in the army, a number that must
compare favorably, for instance, with the officer corps of virtually any big business concern in the United States. See Charles Moskos, From Citizens' Army to Social Laboratory, Wilson Q., Winter 1993, at 83, 88.
26. My own view is that abortion rights are best left right in the due process orbit
where Justice Blackmun situated them. The Equal Protection Clause is most appropriately used to bring into relief a comparison between the treatment of two groups, where
the treatment of one is taken to be established as legitimate or illegitimate. See note 15
supra. But, as Sunstein himself notes, "nothing is quite like pregnancy.... If fetuses are
to survive, it must be a result of impositions on women. Selectivity is foreordained by the
brute facts of human physiology." (275, 281) In such an environment, comparison with
some different treatment of men is bound to be unenlightening.
Other wise voices besides Sunstein's have urged the equal protection route, see, e.g.,
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1185, 1198-1200
(1992), but I remain doubtful. Besides the conceptual difficulties discussed in the text, an
equal protection approach may represent a tactical mistake for advocates of abortion
rights, for it focuses on women as the disadvantaged group just as more women-many of
whom may not favor abortion rights-are attaining political power. Over time, the political disadvantagement prop for the equal protection rationale might just collapse.
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ioned constitutionalist like myself, the political impenetrability
provides at least the starting point of an argument that judicial
review of the question is appropriate.27 But for a civic republican, the very complexity of the issue should make it quintessentially appropriate for political forums where a wealth of "new
information and new perspectives" can be brought to bear.
My concern about Sunstein's vision of a deliberative democracy runs deeper than questions about the depth of his devotion
to it, for in its name he advocates positions that seem oblivious to
questions of how public policy actually is made. The phrase "deliberative democracy" is rife with ambiguity on such questions,
and Sunstein has done almost nothing to help us cut through the
ambiguities.
The beauty of the classical republican vision was that it suggested simultaneous solution of two of mankind's deepest dilemmas, how to have virtuous individuals and responsible
government. The republican citizen exemplified virtue in participation in governance, precisely because acting in this public capacity he chose responsibly rather than selfishly. But this
simultaneous solution of the two problems depended upon their
interaction, and the modem day has largely separated them. In
the contemporary United States, save for the act of voting, very
few individuals do-or could hope to-take active part in governance at all, let alone at the national level, where many of the
most important decisions are made. Sunstein's mechanism is
thoroughly anachronistic. We live in an age of division of labor,
and there is simply no way that we can tum either the clock or
the geography back to a setting where governance can be by
agreement among equal citizens.
Of course, Sunstein cannot literally mean that agreement of
all citizens is necessary, but it is not at all clear what he does
mean. To make a real stab at tying the strands of republicanism
around the unwieldy modem day, it seems important to get a
handle on the connection between citizen input into public decisions and the legislative output.
Sunstein has a great deal to say about input at the citizen
level. His emphasis, as I have said, is on citizen ability to contribute to a political dialogue. It is in pursuit largely of that goal that
he would mold the First Amendment's protection of speech.
There are also times when he seems to focus on the legislative
deliberations, and after all that is where the public policy deci27. See Robert W. Bennett, Abortion and Judicial Review: Of Burdens and Benefits,
Hard Cases and Some Bad Law, 75 Nw. U. L. Rev. 978, 992-99 (1981).
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sions on which the book focuses so much attention are finally
made. (27) Thus in trying to make out the case that the Framers
had a deliberative democracy in mind from the outset, he points
to the fact that the constitutional convention was closed "from
public view." (22) But Sunstein has almost nothing to say about
the way in which non-legislator inputs contribute to the outputs.
His apparent approval of the closing of the constitutional convention is only suggestive of how complex those connections
might be thought to be.
Consider Sunstein's advocacy of rights of access to the
broadcast media. He rehearses contemporary maladies of broadcasting and concludes that citizen involvement through access
rights can only enrich the mix. This might well be responsive to
an individual sense of alienation from the political process, and
in this sense could give those who gain the access a sense of political involvement and hence individual fulfillment.2s But that is a
very different thing from contributing to a higher quality of public decisionmaking.
There is at least a plausible argument that access rights detract from the dialogue in which public decisions are forged. For
rights of access likely tend to weaken the media that are required
to provide those rights. Those media must relinquish space or
time to satisfy the rights, and this provides them with incentives
to say and do less that will trigger the access rights. Sunstein, for
instance, seems to favor reinvigoration of the "fairness doctrine,"
(223) under which broadcasters who carry material on controversial issues of public importance must provide "balance" on those
issues. The clear incentive is to avoid such programming. And if
broadcasters overcome those incentives, they lose a degree of
control over the substance of what gets said. They are thus diminished both editorially and economically, and that makes them
less effective contributors to informed public decisionmaking.
Whether this is a good or bad thing in terms of contributions
to eventual legislative deliberations depends, in part at least, on
whether media in general make more effective contributions to
those deliberations than do the individuals to whom the reforms
28. At one point Sunstein considers the possibility that the First Amendment free
speech guarantee might be aimed at protecting "the development of individual capacities." He rejects this view in favor of protection of political speech in support of deliberative democracy. The latter, he says, holds "out the best promise for organizing our
considered judgments about the range of cases likely to raise hard First Amendment
questions." (239) Entirely unattended is the possibility that the First Amendment might
be aimed at-and have to be understood as compromising among-a multiplicity of
values.
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Sunstein advances would afford access they would not otherwise
have achieved. Sunstein insists that the "consequences" of one
approach to speech or another are what really count, but he
seems not to have in mind consequences like these that should
really matter if one's concern is with contribution to eventual
outcomes.
There is another problem with Sunstein's prescription for
citizen input, besides questions about their comparative ability to
make a substantive contribution. It is not obvious that more citizen access to media yields better understanding even of their
content. More here may not be better. The last decade has seen
an incredible proliferation of the means, and correspondingly the
amount, of both public and private communication,z9 but each of
us has a limited capacity to listen and to absorb. After that communications to us can get in the way of one another. They impart
more and more noise and less and less information.3o
While Sunstein notes the proliferation of media, he also
seems oblivious to these implications. He suggests (though far
from explicitly} that the republican approach to speech (he calls
it the "Madisonian ideal" (213)) is to obtain the maximum
amount of it, and the maximum amount of audience for each utterance (with some unspecified credit thrown in for "diversity").
Thus more than once he says that people are "prevented from
speaking" or are not speaking "freely" if they don't have access
to places or media where they can increase the size of their audience. (207, 215)
The apparent assumption behind Sunstein's positions is that
all inputs have equal capacity for contributing to outputs, at least
if appropriately amplified. But it is hard to imagine that he could
believe any such thing.31 Obviously public opinion influences
legislative behavior, even between elections. And appearances
29. This is most obviously true in the case of public and private electronic media, but
it is also the case, for instance, that the number of magazine titles in the United States has
nearly doubled over the last decade. See New York limes, Dec. 6, 1993 at C6.
30. My colleague Gary Lawson points out that this problem may run much deeper.
In comments on a draft of this review, Gary said: "If the goal of republicanism is to turn
the country into a gigantic town meeting, with every aspect of public and private life
(there is, according to Sunstein, no difference) up for grabs in the political marketplace,
no individual can possibly be informed as to every issue, or even most issues. This is a
prescription for interest group warfare of the worst kind, as people concentrate on those
aspects of the political process in which they have a comparative advantage." Gary insists
that the point is not original with him.
31. See David P. Currie, The Most Insignificant Justice: A Preliminary Inquiry, 50 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 466, 473 (1983) ("[I]t is widely accepted among scholars-though to my
knowledge it has never been scientifically demonstrated-that not all pages of words are
of equal intellectual value.")
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in mass media, including those achieved through any access
rights, can affect legislative deliberations directly, or indirectly by
affecting public opinion. But communications vary in their intelligence, imagination, and in the research and learning that inform
them, and these matters are relevant to the capacity of these
communications to contribute to legislative outcomes. Without
attending to these matters, one cannot say whether more citizen
access to public media and public forums will add or detract from
the stock of useful contributions to the dialogue about public
issues.
It is true that I have here diverged from the procedural test
for public policy decisions that Sunstein announces-agreement
among equal citizens. As indicated, he cannot be serious about
that test, but if that really were the touchstone of legitimacy, it
would be unthinkable that the persuasiveness and hence the substance of what is said would be irrelevant in achieving that agreement. It is Sunstein, after all, who tells us that his ideal is a
"republic of reason." (10) And as long as substance matters in
the deliberative process, it will not do simply to assume that a
proliferation of even amplified talk about public policy will improve the decisions that are made in its name.
Without any persuasive answer to whether the moves Sunstein suggests would contribute to the effective discussion of public issues, I recur to the argument of Section I, above. While our
First Amendment jurisprudence is far from a coherent whole, it
has largely resisted the kind of encroachments on the prerogatives of (at least) print media that Sunstein's approach would encourage. My own sense is that deliberations about public policy
suffer from lots of problems, but a dearth of imaginative and constructive suggestions for change is not one of them. Until the
status quo in media rights is shown more clearly to be "broke," I
wouldn't try to fix it, and certainly not in the name of deliberative democracy.
III

The recent interest in republicanism undoubtedly comes in
reaction to law and economics and to the extension of its homo
economicus to the realm of politics in what is called "social
choice theory." The "rational" actor of economic and of social
choice theory is guided by self-interest. Much of the attempt to
tease implications for constitutionalism from social choice theory
proceeds from a vision of the citizen that stresses the role of selfinterested behavior. Such behavior takes political form through

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

418

[Vol. 11:395

the deployment of what James Madison called "factions" and we
today call "pressure groups" or "interest groups" or, most ominously, "special interests." In a perhaps extreme but not uncommon form, social choice theorists employ a model of government
that includes no public-regarding motivation at all. It is this version with which Sunstein sets out to do battle. He insists that
such single-minded self-interest in the political realm is inaccurate on a descriptive level and impermissible as a normative
matter.
Containing the mischief of faction was, of course, a central
concern of Madison. His Tenth Federalist is devoted to the advantages that a "well-constructed union" would have because of
its "tendency to break and control the violence of faction."32
There is obviously a major embarrassment for republican constitutionalism here, since the civic republican antifederalists lost,
and it is a Madisonian Constitution that contemporary republicans like Sunstein are attempting to steer. Sunstein relieves the
embarrassment by finding civic republican themes in the writings
of Madison, Hamilton, and other federalists. That Madison and
other federalists shared some views with antifederalists cannot be
doubted. Whatever may be said of modern social choice theorists, for example, Madison clearly thought that public-regarding
behavior was possible by those in authority, and that deliberation
among the public-spirited was a good thing.
But Sunstein considerably overstates his case when he finds
the encouragement of public spirited deliberation at the heart of
the Madisonian system. Here is what Sunstein says:
The basic institutions of the ... Constitution were intended to
encourage and to profit from deliberation .... The system of
checks and balances-the cornerstone of the system-was
designed to encourage discussion among different governmental entities. So too with the requirement of bicameralism,
which would bring different perspectives to bear on lawmaking. The same goals accounted for the notion that laws should
be presented to the President for his signature or veto; this
mechanism would provide an additional perspective. The federal system would ensure a supplemental form of dialogue
Judicial review was intended to create a further check. Its
basic purpose was to protect the considered judgments of the
people, as represented in the extraordinary law of the Constitution, against the ill-considered or short-term considerations
32.

Federalist No. 10 (James Madison).
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introduced by the people's mere agents in the course of enacting ordinary law. (23)

The typical account of all the Madisonian mechanisms that
Sunstein mentions is that they were adopted as hurdles to get in
the way of faction-inspired legislation, not as mechanisms for deliberation.33 It is well known that Madison advocated a large republic as a means of proliferating factions, the better to combat
factional power. With more and individually less powerful factions, and multiple units of government through which they
might operate, Madison thought factions would check one another, and thus accomplish less mischief. Thus the very mechanisms of governance that Sunstein depicts as designed to
facilitate deliberation, Madison advocated instead as obstacles to
decision. It is true that Madison thought that legislation in the
public interest would emerge from the process, but the focus of
his concern was to filter out undesirable, not to promote desirable, legislation. The reasons for this are fairly clear. When "a
small number of citizens ... assemble and administer the government in person," Madison warned, "there is nothing to check the
inducements to sacrifice the weaker party or an obnoxious individual." And even in representative assemblies:
It is vain to say that enlightened statesmen will be able to adjust these clashing interests and render them all subservient to
the public good. Enlightened statesmen will not always be at
the helm. Nor, in many cases, can such an adjustment be
made at all without taking into view indirect and remote considerations, which will rarely prevail over the immediate inter33. Sunstein disavows the intention "to provide anything like an exhaustive historical account." (18). Rather he is in search of "a usable past." (18). The problem is that
Madison's vision for government is so different from Sunstein's that the historical evidence for a past Sunstein can use is hard to come by. Thus he quotes Hamilton (twice) as
saying in Federalist 70 that " 'differences of opinion, and the jarrings of parties in [the
legislative] department ... often promote deliberation ... .' " (24, 253) Hamilton does
say that, but the subject of Federalist 70 is the executive. Hamilton makes an extended
and impassioned case for a single rather than a plural executive, on the ground that only a
single executive can bring the necessary energy for the effective execution of the law.
That obviously suggested the question of how the plural legislature could be effective. To
that question, Hamilton gave a complex answer, including that "in the legislature, promptitude of decision is oftener an evil than a benefit." He acknowledged that the plurality of
the legislature "may sometimes obstruct salutary plans," and he praised it as serving "to
check excesses in the majority." Sandwiched among these points is that it might also
"promote deliberation and circumspection.'' "Deliberation" here might well have been
meant to be synonymous with "circumspection," meaning something like "caution.'' But
even if it was meant in Sunstein's apparent sense-something like "reasoned discussion"-in context the mention of deliberation, by Hamilton, not Madison, seems pretty
insignificant.
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est which one party will find in disregarding the rights of
another or the good of the whole.34

Madison and Sunstein also differ in the mechanisms by
which they believe that public-regarding legislation may win out
over factional legislation. Madison mentions two mechanisms,
the larger constituencies from which legislators will be chosen in
the larger republic, making it more likely that "enlightened
statesmen" will be found; and the "limitation of the term of appointments,"Js by which he seems to have meant the necessity
for periodic approval by the voters. For Sunstein, on the other
hand, the answer seems to lie basically in the application of reason once democratic deliberation takes place.
Sunstein acknowledges that the republican vision of participatory democracy is romantic, in part because self-interested
politics is a pervasive part of the process. (21, 27-28) He asserts,
and I am inclined to grant that he is right, that there is also an
important public-regarding element in most political decisions.36
(27-28) He is surely also right when he says that "sometimes
people motivated to vote for certain legislation cannot easily disentangle the private and public factors that underlie the decision." (28) Having acknowledged this, however, he proceeds as
if the glass is half full, but not simultaneously half empty.
The dilemma here is that Madison's and Sunstein's visions
for government are not congruent or even compatible, as Sunstein suggests, but opposed. Sunstein wants to facilitate deliberation and ultimately "public interest" decisionmaking, while
Madison wanted to impede the process and produce less selfish
legislating. The only one who suggests a mechanism by which we
might have the one without the other is Sunstein, and that mechanism is "reason." But there is no warrant for thinking that
Madison, whose exclusive focus was structural, would have been
consoled by this appeal to man's better self. It was just such seduction that Madison erected his system to circumvent.
Still, it is not clear that the Madisonian system has accomplished its aims. No serious observer of contemporary American
politics doubts that interest-group politics is thriving. I have no
way to measure its extent or to know how much of it Madison
would have found tolerable. I don't suppose that Madison
34.
35.
36.
Books,
Theory

ld.
Federalist No. 51 (James Madison).
See Arthur Maass, Congress and the Common Good 5, 18-19, 64-74 (Basic
1983); Abner J. Mikva, Foreword 74 Va. L. Rev. 167 (1988) (Symposium on the
of Public Choice).
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imagined that the structural devices he advanced would banish
factional politics from the land. But it is not implausible to suppose that Madison would find the present level excessive. Nor is
it hard to come up with an explanation of what went wrong-and
it's not status quo neutrality, or insufficient public access to the
mass media. What Madison could hardly have foreseen was the
growth of the United States economy, with implications for how
powerful the lure of interest-group politics would come to beso powerful that it could surmount the obstacles put in its way.
And if this is viewed as the problem, it would be compounded by
Sunstein's treatment of status quo neutrality. For if existing
property arrangements are no more insulated from majoritarian
decisionmaking than a requirement that Sunsteinian reasons be
given for invasion, then the society's resources would be even
more readily accessible as interest-group spoils.
Now it would be perverse to depict the growth in the economy over the past two hundred years as something that has gone
"wrong." A flourishing interest-group politics may simply be a
price we pay for the combination we enjoy of prosperity and democracy. But if we set our sights on Madison's target, we will be
led at least to consider a very different set of reforms than those
Sunstein advances. To a great extent a contemporary Madisonian agenda would consist of items that have found their way
into public discourse and politics. This is testament to the enduring appeal of Madison's diagnosis and to his structural approach
to treatment.
For instance, a balanced budget amendment to the Constitution might rein in the appetites of interest groups. The requirement of a balanced budget would mean that expensive interestgroup projects would naturally be opposed by the taxpaying public and indeed by other interest groups either seeking to avoid
paying the costs or competing for the scarce resources. Similarly,
term limitations for Congressmen and Senators might be an item
on a neo-Madisonian agenda. There is an argument that term
limitations would strengthen the hands of congressional staff
members, and that interest groups could then work even more
effectively through them. It is possible, however, that the class of
professional politicians that the lack of term limits has allowed to
proliferate and flourish tends to dampen the public-interest dialogue both at election time and in the legislative process.
Still another idea that might dampen interest-group politics
is an executive line-item veto. This would, of course, strengthen
the hand of the executive vis-a-vis the Congress, but that might
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be a sensible move if one thought that the executive was less susceptible to interest-group pressures than the Congress. It has
also been suggested that spiraling federal budget deficits may be
caused by a proliferation of congressional committees with
spending power, and the absence of any central body to bring
discipline to the process.37 A neo-Madisonian might try to bring
structural change to the workings of the Congress as a way to
address this part of the problem.Js And finally, concern with interest group politics could lead to a call for reinvigorated judicial
review rather than the withdrawal that Sunstein (at least sometimes) urges.39 The judiciary is, after all, the branch most insulated from politics and hence from interest group pressures.
None of these suggestions comes without its costs. There is,
for instance, respectable-perhaps even overwhelming-economic opinion that a balanced budget amendment would be a
bad idea.40 And there are powerful arguments-many of which
Sunstein presents-that judicial review can stifle political
processes and thus defer or scuttle solutions to problems with a
greater chance to endure.4t (145) But these measures do not for
37. John Cogan, What Really Causes Those Budget Deficits, Fortune, Oct. 18, 1993,
at 116.
38. An intriguing way to facilitate public interest deliberations by legislators is suggested in John W. Ellwood and Eric M. Patashnik, In Praise of Pork, 110 Public Interest
19 (1993). One of the dilemmas of the "public-interest legislator" is that reelection is
facilitated by responsiveness to interest groups. Even if it is assumed that much legislation can serve both public and private purposes simultaneously (as indeed is necessary if
there is such a thing as public-interest legislation), the public-interest legislator may well
have an incentive to vote for interest-group legislation that at least in the aggregate will
be more costly than his sense of the public interest would tolerate in the absence of interest-group pressure. Ellwood and Patashnik argue for what might be called an "optimal"
rather than a minimal (or zero) level of interest-group legislation that takes the form of
costly benefits, or "pork." And, while they don't quite put it this way, the optimal level
seems to be that amount necessary to sustain legislators politically, so that they can feel
secure in advancing public-interest legislation. One particular suggestion they make is
that legislation that builds constituent favors in automatically, like the indexing of social
security benefits in 1972, is unfortunate, since it deprives legislators of repeated occasions
to curry constituent goodwill at no greater overall cost.
This thesis strikes me, as it does the authors, as Madisonian, id. at 21, but it also
suggests that the distinction between structural and nonstructural reform will not always
be so clear. If legislators were to follow Ellwood and Patashnik's suggestion, they would
have repeated occasions to do so, or not. The "reform" if adopted by means short of a
constitutional amendment would become structural more by education and habit than by
virtue of anything that could be "built" into the legislative processes.
39. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 Stan. L.
Rev. 29, 43 n.62 (1985).
40. See Susan Cornwell, Economists Disagree on Balanced Budget Amendment,
Reuters, June 1, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuters file.
41. While I was writing this review Chicagoans were witness to an apparent example
of this phenomenon, as political resolution of the latest financing controversy surrounding
the Chicago public schools was deferred until the possibility of court resolution had
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the most part even enter into Sunstein's discussion, because, in
seeking to bring his own theories under Madison's attractive tent,
he has ignored what Madison taught life was really like under
there.
CONCLUSION
One of the strengths of The Partial Constitution is that it evidences sophistication about so much that is its undoing. Sunstein
is intellectually very broadly gauged, and that makes many of his
specific discussions engaging and informative. But the whole
does not fit together, and that makes the book a disappointment.
There seem to be two reinforcing causes for the failure.
First is that Sunstein advances a procedural remedy (deliberative
democracy) when his ultimate concerns often seem to be deeply
substantive. Ironically, this could be depicted as reaching out for
a false neutrality, which is, of course, Sunstein's suggestion of
where the rest of us have gone wrong. The second is his
penchant for systematization. There is an initial allure to both of
the central notions he deploys-deliberative democracy and status quo neutrality-because they seem at first blush to help capture and to order so many troubling pieces of the contemporary
constitutional scene. As Sunstein deploys them, however, they
dissolve into little more than slogans.
Theories do not, of course, have to capture all of reality to
be useful or "valid." Sunstein's failing is in pretending that he
has presented a full description of a problem and a coherent approach to its solution. He has done neither, though he has
presented a good measure of interesting constitutional commentary along the way.

passed. See Editorial, So Close, So Far Apan on Schools, Chicago Tribune, Nov. 4, 1993,
at A30.

